UDC 94(581)

THE REIGN OF ZAMAN SHAH: AN ATTEMPT OF THE DURRANI EMPIRE TO SURVIVE

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Abstract. The article is devoted to an Afghan monarch, Zaman Shah Durrani (1793-1801), the third ruler of the Durrani Empire, and discusses such problems as the struggle for power in a monarchy with no strict order of succession and many contenders for the throne due to the polygamy of the monarch and the reliance of the monarchy on different clans and influence groups; the complexity of managing an empire, which was based on the loyalty of the leaders of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes; the difficulty of governing a vast empire, the outskirts of which were prone to revolts against the central government; and, the last but not the least, the ultimate doom of an empire of this (seminomadic, medieval) type before empires of a new type – European colonial empires of Modern times. The life of Zaman Shah consisted of endless campaigns from the East to the West and from the West to the East of his weakening Empire. Zaman was the most competent of the brothers and tried to contribute to benefit of the nation and for the peace and prosperity of the country, but all his attempts at Indian conquest (in which his grandfather succeeded) were ill-directed and ill-timed, though the hopes of the Muslims of India related to him as a defender of Islam against the advancing East India Company. Dreaming only about India, Zaman didn’t pay much attention to the securing of the support of his own tribe and didn’t bother much to defend Khorasan which had become the object of desire of a new Persian ruler – Agha Mohammad Shah Qajar. Under Zaman Shah, the Durrani Empire remained a regional power, but the crisis of Afghan statehood, which erupted after Zaman Shah’s reign, led to the collapse of the Durrani Empire and to the fragmentation of Afghanistan.

Keywords: Afghanistan, the Durrani Empire, Zaman Shah Durrani, Ahmad Shah Durrani, Pashtuns, nomads, tribalism, monarchy, crisis of power, crisis of state.

Тірек сөздер: Ауғанстан, Дуррани империясы, Заман шах Дуррани, Ахмад шах Дуррани, пуштундар, кошпенділер, трайбализм, монархия, билик дағдарысы, мемлекет дағдарысы.


ПРАВЛЕНИЕ ЗАМАН-ШАХА: ПОПЫТКА СОХРАНИТЬ ИМПЕРИЮ ДУРРАНИ
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Аннотация. В статье говорится о периоде правления третьего шаха афганской династии Дуррани, Заман-шаха (1793–1801), отмеченном большими усилиями по сохранению не только имперского статуса Афганистана, но и его статуса региональной державы; выявляются причины, по которым эти усилия оказались напрасными и произошел не только распад империи, но и фрагментация самого афганского государства. Отмечается, что среди причин кризиса афганской государственности были как внутренние, связанные с отпадением инородных по отношению к пештунскому центру окраин и соперничеством отдельных кланов в борьбе за власть, так и внешние, прежде всего начало «Большой игры» европейских колониальных империй. Это существенно изменило ситуацию по сравнению с периодом правления деда Заман-шаха, основателя империи Дуррани Ахмад-шаха (1747–1773), бывшего для Заман-шаха политическим ориентиром. Работа построена на анализе афганских персоязычных источников «Тарих-и Султани» и «Сирадж ат-таварих», а также на материале, собранном английскими, афганскими и советскими и российскими историками.

Ключевые слова: Афганистан, империя Дуррани, Заман Шах Дуррани, Ахмад Шах Дуррани, пуштуны, кочевники, трайбализм, монархия, кризис власти, кризис государства.


Introduction. Timur Shah Durrani’s son Shah-Zaman (Zaman Shah), who succeeded him on the throne, attempted to reassemble the Durrani Empire and restore Afghanistan’s former glory achieved four decades before by his grandfather Ahmad Shah Durrani who many times successfully invaded India. Shah Zaman considered himself the true heir of his grandfather and the emperor (Shahinshah), and therefore did not even allow the thought of further fragmentation of the state which had started during his father’s reign. In a long struggle for power with his brothers, Zaman managed to establish himself on the Kabul throne and secure Kandahar and Herat, as well as Baluchistan, whose ruler again recognized the suzerainty of an Afghan sovereign. After the death of Nasir Khan Baluch in 1795, the successor of the Baluch Khan also recognized the vassalage. But Shah Zaman’s most important aspiration in foreign policy was the desire to reestablish Afghan dominance in India and let the Durrani Empire to survive at the eve of the 19th century and the coming of a new era, that of European colonialism.

From the end of the 18th century, the Great Britain, with the help of the East India Company, began to actively attack the Indian states lying southeast of Afghanistan, and, following Bengal, subjugated the Maratha principalities. In this situation, the Muslim rulers of Northern India appealed to Zaman Shah as the defender of Islam and their “last hope” at the face of advancing power of the “infidels,” just as in the middle of the 18th century the Muslims of East Turkestan appealed to Ahmad Shah, calling on him to rally the Muslims of all Central Asia and repel the Qings. Driven by the idea of “protecting” their Indian possessions, the British moved further and

1 Timur Shah (1773-1793) was the second emperor of the Durrani dynasty after his father and the founder of the Durrani Empire, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1773).
further to the north-west, towards the riches of Punjab and Kashmir, with a long view to Afghanistan, Herat, and all Central Asia.

However, at the turn of the century, Great Britain discovered in Afghanistan’s ruler a strong adversary, capable of not only making grandiose plans, but also pursuing an independent foreign policy line, holding the initiative, threatening, and attracting allies under his banner. The first political and geographical picture of Afghanistan that the British formed during their clash with Zaman Shah was very flattering for the Afghans.

Shah Zaman’s occupation of Lahore in 1796, created a sensation in India. At that time, the Mughal state was living its last days, and Northern India was fragmented into many small possessions. Therefore, the north of India was an arena of disorder and anarchy, which “no doubt would have immediately opened up to the Shah [Zaman] had he begun his march on Delhi” [Elphinstone, 1815, v. II: 315-316]. And although, due to the need to be torn on two fronts, Zaman Shah was forced to abandon the idea of conquering Delhi and returned to Kabul, the impression of his appearance in Punjab remained for a long time. Many years passed before the Marathas got rid of the fear of the “new Ahmad Shah”. And the British, trying to prevent Zaman’s alliance with the ruler of Mysore, Tipu Sultan, sent an embassy to Fath Ali Shah Qajar in 1799 and actively supported Prince Mahmud in his fight against Zaman.

Thus, largely thanks to the efforts of Zaman Shah Durrani, at the end of the 18th century. Afghanistan continued to play an active role in regional geopolitics, acting as a regional power capable of dictating its will to many neighboring states and attempting to regain its imperial glory. However, the question is how successful this attempt could have been in principle. On the one hand, the Durrani state was an empire of the traditional Central Asian type, in which a nomadic or semi-nomadic tribal conference controlled vast territories populated by sedentary subjects of different ethnic and religious background. Empires and states of this type (for example, Turkic-Mongolian ones) usually suffered from separatism not so much of the conquered sedentary territories as of individual tribal leaders. The Pashtun Empire was no exception in this regard. On the other hand, it seems that the time of such nomadic (in essence) empires had passed by the end of the eighteenth century, and the Durrani Empire, following the Dzungar Empire and the Empire of Nadir Shah, was doomed due to the change in the general situation in Eurasia and the beginning of the colonial era.

Method and sources.

The article is based mostly on Persian sources of 19th- early 20th century from Afghanistan, such as Tarikh-i Sultani and Siraj at-Tawarikh. Analyzing and comparing the data of these sources with European data (mainly from the account of Sir M. Elphinstone (1815) who was a British diplomat very well informed on Afghan affairs), I am trying to demonstrate the main features of Afghan politics on the eve of the nineteenth century and the vanity of Zaman Shah’s political and geopolitical ambitions. The article also uses the works of Afghan, Soviet and British researchers of the history of Afghanistan.

Discussion.

In Summer 1809, Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone, British envoy to the Court of Afghan Shah Shuja ul-Mulk, succeeded to meet in Rawalpindi a man who had equally experienced the splendor of real eminence as well as the tragedy of real defeat and who was the last of the three great Durrani emperors. That man was Shah-Zaman. A few years later Elphinstone has given the following portrait of the ex-monarch of Afghanistan:

“His dress was plain; a white mantle, faced with Persian brocade, and a black shawl turban; but his appearance was very kingly. He looked about 40 when we saw him. He had a fine face and person. His voice and manner strongly resembled Shauh Shujah’s; but he was taller, and had a longer, more regular face, and a finer beard. He had by no means the appearance of a blind man; his eyes, though plainly injured, retained black enough to give invacity to his countenance; and he always turned them towards the person with whom he was conversing. He had, however, some appearance of dejection and melancholy...” [Elphinstone, 1815, v. I: 104].

But only 16 years before such a sorrowful meeting, a 25-years-old Shahzada (prince) Shah-Zaman (he was also called Muhammad-Zaman) was hurrying headlong towards Jalalabad from
Kabul, where he had been since recently governing according to his kingly father’s order. Longing to find his dying father still alive he was in such a haste that two horses had been overdriven; the news of Timur Shah’s mortal disease had caught him at unawares. When he finally reached his father in a place called Chahar Bagh, Timur Shah “received him with great tenderness // in open arms of compassion and mercifully granted him one of his best racehorses with a gold harness” [TS, 1298: 160-161]. Afterwards they together moved to Kabul, and on the 7th of Shavval, 1207 (May 19th, 1793), Timur Shah passed away.

The reason for Shah-Zaman’s hurry was not only the wish to embrace for the last time his parent who had been so kindly disposed to him. Far more important was the extremely complicated problem of the succession to the Durrani throne. After Timur Shah’s death the throne was claimed simultaneously by several of his sons; all of them being the governors of several provinces of the Durrani Empire. There was absolutely no consent on that question among the dynasties. Jealousy and competition within the polygamous marriage were so deep-rooted and so permeated with hatred that the hopelessness of a consensus or a peaceful agreement between the stepbrothers became evident very soon. According to TS and ST, Timur Shah had twenty-four sons, and Aziz ud-Din Wakili Fufalzai claims that there were thirty-four of them in whole [Fufalzai, 1968, v.1: 34, 262].

Four princes were most active and considered the most obvious pretenders to the throne. The eldest of them was Shahzada Humayun, “the Prince of Kandahar”, who ruled in the capital of his great ancestor, Ahmad Shah. His mother was a daughter of a Sadozai sardar (nobleman) and in the beginning of his father’s rule Humayun was honored as a future successor to the Durrani throne. His trumps were the right of the first-born (primogeniture) and the support of Kandahari people, mostly the Durranis. The second son was Sultan-Mahmud, “the Prince of Herat”, where he lived with his full brother Firuz ud-Din counting on the help of the Barakzais to which tribe their mother belonged. Shahzada Abbas, Timur Shah’s son by a daughter of Shah Pasand Khan Ishakzai, was the third of the rivals. During the last years of his father’s reign, he was a governor of Peshawar (“the Prince of Peshawar”). His claim was supported by most minor brothers with exception of young Shuja ul-Mulk (in 1793 he was about 10 years old) who was the uterine brother of the fourth pretender: Shah-Zaman, who was “the Prince of Kabul”. Their mother was a Yusufzai.

Zaman was presumably the fourth son of Timur Shah after Humayun, Mahmud and obscure Ahmad; such is his position in the list of TS (p. 160) repeated by ST (p. 44). In another place in TS Zaman is called the third son: “his beloved third son Shahzada Zaman” [Ibid.]. In the longest list of Shahzadas, grouping the uterine brothers [Fufalzai, 1968, v. 1: 34], Zaman is listed as the seventh, after Abbas but before Ahmad. Vadim Romodin (Romodin, 1965: 143) and Sir Percy Sykes [Sykes, 1940: 371] call him the fifth son of the second Durrani monarch. Anyway, being only one of the shahzadas of that age, he became a padishah (a king). How did it happen?

We don’t know precisely if Shah-Zaman was appointed as a successor by Timur Shah. Elphinstone writes: “At the time of Timour Shauh’s death nothing was settled respecting the succession to the throne. He had himself named no heir” [Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 307]. This opinion is divided by Rishtiya [Rishtiya, 1958: 33]. Sykes writes that “as was only to be expected, there was wild excitement as to which of the numerous sons of the deceased King should be elected to the throne” [Sykes, 1940: 371]. Kohzad stresses that “contrary to Timour-shah..., who did not declare any of his sons as heir to the throne... amir Dost Mohamed Khan... gave special attention to this matter of succession” and named an heir beforehand [Kohzad, 1967: 172].

But there is also a different point of view; the above-cited place from TS ends with the statement: “his beloved third son shahzada Zaman was appointed to Kabul as the heir to the throne [ba vali’ahd].” Faiz Muhammad confirms: “Shahzada Zaman, the heir to the throne [vali’ahd], lived in the capital city of Kabul” [ST, 1331: 44]. Aziz ud-Din Wakili Fufalzai considers the “wise election” of Shahzada Shah-Zaman as a successor to the throne one of the most positive steps of Timur Shah and allot a whole chapter to this problem: “Vali’ahd is a person whom padishah during his lifetime by his own will appoints as a successor to his throne. An heir to the throne is elected among the eldest and most outstanding shahzadas trusted by the king”. And then: “Timur-shah...intended to elect an heir to the throne and his successor the one of his active and energetic
sons who from all sides would be worthy to become a monarch. Shah Zaman, who had inherited the character and disposition both of great Ahmad Shah and of Timur Shah, was elected among the thirty-four sons¹ to defend the honor [namus] of the Afghan state” [Fufalzai, 1968, v. 1: 262]. According to Fufalzai, “by the end of Timur Shah’s reign it became evident that Shahzada Shah-Zaman had grown up as one of the most gifted representatives of the Durrani dynasty” [Ibid.]. So, we can conclude that most likely, contrary to the established tradition of transferring power to the eldest son, Shah-Zaman was chosen in advance as the heir to the throne by his father Timur Shah.

Nevertheless, the main Afghan sources, TS and correspondingly ST, support the idea of Zaman’s election by a legend, according to which Timur Shah on his death-bed told Shahzada Zaman and Qazi² Faizullah, both leaning over him, his dream: “I saw somebody who approached me, took off the royal gear and imperial crown from my head and put it on [guzāshtand] the head of Zaman Shah” [TS, 1298: 161]. Faiz Muhammad not by chance changes “somebody” for “some people”, correcting the discrepancy between the Singular of the subject (kasi; somebody) and the Plural of the predicate (guzāshtand): “Some people approached me, took the crown off my head and put it on the head of those of my sons who is present here (i.e., Shah Zaman)” [ST, 1331: 44]. The Plural here is to explain that Timur Shah “was advised” to elect the most gifted and energetic son. The names of the advisers (or those, who “organized” the election after the King’s death) are known. They have been listed in the very beginning of the 15th Chapter of TS which is devoted to the reign of Zaman Shah and in the beginning of the corresponding chapter of ST: Qazi Faizullah Khan Dawlatshahi, Sardar Payinda Khan Barakzai, owning the laqab³ of Sarafraz Khan, Nur Muhammad Amin ul-Mulk Baburi, Mullah Abd ul-Ghafar Khan Jadid ul-Islam, Fathullah Khan Sadozai Multani, Akhtar Muhammad Khan Nurzai, Amir Aslan Khan Jawanshir and Jafar Khan Qizilbash⁴ [TS, 1298: Jafar-Khan-i Parsi, i.e. Persian: p.161]. According to ST, the named Pushhton and Tajik⁵ leaders and religious authorities at first concealed the fact of the King’s death and invited the “great nobles and military commanders” to the Bala Hisar (a citadel in Kabul) ostensibly on behalf of the King. Having gained their consent (it is not mentioned the consent on what), they buried the deceased Padishah and performed the funeral service with the participation of the Shahzadas. Afterwards the leaders and local authorities “questioned the Shahzadas in regard of sultanat (reign)” and as somewhat vaguely said, because “the question of reign is to relate to the existence of one person and is conditioned by the acceptance of the person by all the nobles – both Your Highnesses and the amirs⁶. To elect and prefer the one who can govern the state is the most important of the things” [ST, 1331: 45]. By this statement they implicitly meant Shah Zaman, though it was evident only for them but not for the Shahzadas. Of course, each of the princes who considered himself strong enough, announced his claim. After the long discussions all the brothers decided to elect Shahzada Abbas and, except for Zaman, went to Abbas’ palace “in order to proclaim him the Sultan⁷”. Trying to use a chance, the amirs closed the gates of the palace and put Jawanshiris⁸ on guard, so that the Shahzadas fell under the house arrest [Ibid.].

But the picture somewhat changes when other sources are taken into consideration. So, ZT, an Afghan source that comes from the camp of Shahzada Humayun, describes the new enthroning as follows: “The high-born Shahzadas called for amirs, theologians and scholars ... and held a council. They proclaimed the country needs a ruler. Some people proposed that Humayun had the

¹ Correctly: 34 for children and 24 sons.
² Qazi = Judge.
³ Laqab = honorary nickname, title.
⁴ Mir Aslan Khan Jawanshir and Jafar Khan were the leaders of the Qizilbash (and, generally, of the whole bulk of Persian-speaking population of Kabul and Kabulistan) in the last years of Timur Shah’s reign.
⁵ The leaders of Farsi-speaking communities.
⁶ Amir = emir, commander, tribal leader.
⁷ Sultan = shah, padishah, king.
⁸ Jawanshiris – Jawanshir is one of the tribes within the Afshar confederation. Here, the Turcic/Farsi-speaking guard, the Qizilbash. The Afshars were one of the main Qizilbash tribes, which were the support of the Safavid dynasty in Iran in 16th-17th centuries. To distance himself from the rival Pashtun tribes, Timur Shah relied on a hired guard of immigrants from Iran, who in Afghanistan, remembering the Safavid times, were called Qizilbash.
right to become a king because the late Padishah during his lifetime had appointed him, as his eldest son, an heir to the throne. Another amirs, Shahzada Humayun’s enemies and hostiles, said: “Before his arrival the country would collapse. It would be better to enthrone one of the Shahzadas as a regent so that the empire wouldn’t fall apart until he comes”. Shahzada Abbas, Shahzada Ayub, and other Shahzadas didn’t approve that proposal: “We won’t enthrone anybody unless our eldest brother arrives and ascends the throne instead of our father, for the right of the heir belongs to him”. But Shahzada Zaman preferred to keep silence and didn’t express his content. The treacherous amirs, hostile to Shahzada Humayun came secretly to Shahzada Zaman, made an oath of allegiance to him, and having put Shahzada Zaman on the throne of the Empire, by tricks, lies and false oaths, confined the rest of Shahzadas in the Bala Hisar” [ZT, 1965: 55].

Further on we’ll see that Humayun’s claim was based not only on his seniority but as well on the support of some part of Durranis settled in and around Kandahar. In a struggle between several fractions, it was the group of Payinda Khan who became the winner. Faiz Muhammad points out “the precious efforts of sardar Payinda Khan exerted for his (Zaman Shah’s) reign and enthroning” [Ibid.]. The outstanding role of Payinda Khan in this case has been emphasized by many historians. Sykes writes: “Payanda Khan...favoured Zaman Mirza...and won over to his views many other Chiefs together with the leaders of the Kizilbash” [Sykes, 1940: 371]. Kohzad selects from TS and ST only three names, and among them Payinda Khan; he points out that these wise and highly experienced men knew in full that Zaman was the most competent of the brothers and tried to contribute to benefit of the nation and for the peace and prosperity of the country and therefore states: “Sirdar Payunda Khan, Qazi Fizullah Khan and Mullah Abul Ghafer Khan ... had prepared the people for Zaman Shah’s ascending to the throne of his father: furthermore, these gentlemen had secured the adhesion of Zaman Shah’s brothers to Zaman Shah’s occupying the throne after Timour Shah... Sirdar Payinda Khan, due to his wise manipulation and sagacity managed to overcome the difficulties, and solved the problem in favour of Zaman Shah” [Kohzad, 1967: 9]. This opinion is divided by Rishtiya: “Having found him [Zaman] worthy for the King’s role, Payinda-Khan considered the support of him his own responsibility. Thanks to the efforts of Payinda-Khan, Zaman Shah ascended the throne” [Rishtiya, 1958: 34].

Another supposition is made by Elphinstone who was informed that the crown was secured to Zaman due to an intrigue carried on by Timur Shah’s favorite queen (presumably Zaman’s mother? – Z.D.). The queen “persuaded on Sirafrauz Khaun (=Payinda-Khan) ... to join her scheme, and by his means secured the interest of most of Dooranee Khauns” [Elphinstone, 1815, v. 2: 308].

The support of Payinda Khan became more evident later when Zaman Shah had to fight his elder brothers Humayun and Mahmud who hadn’t agreed with their suppressed position. As for the younger brothers, sooner or later they agreed to recognize Zaman’s supremacy and were transferred to the Bala Hisar where they enjoyed more “normal” conditions of the house arrest. Only Shahzada Shuja ul-Mulk was prescribed to stay with the King and follow him everywhere [ST, 1331: 45]. Shahzada Humayun sent to Zaman Shah a message containing a categorical refuse “to bind a waist of obedience with the belt of submission” because of his seniority and the fact that “the province of Kandahar had been delivered to him by their crowned father” [TS, 1298: 161]. In ZT Shahzada Humayun’s claim for the throne (“My great father during his lifetime having appointed me his executor and the guardian of my brothers, made me the governor of the powerful state. Now my parent’s heritage is inherited by me”) is partly supported by the Durranis who “colluded like locusts and ants” and proclaimed that “We are sacrificing our precious lives on the devotion path to the Qibla of the World” (i.e., to Humayun) [ZT, 1965: 57-58].

Probably Humayun understood that because of his unpopularity beyond the confines of Kandahar he couldn’t be the ruler of the whole empire. He didn’t trust even the Durranis (See in

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1 “After five days of starvation diet” [Sykes, History, v.1: 371].
2 Humayun-mirza was appointed the governor (Wali) of Kandahar in 1186 (1773) when he was 9 years old and during the whole reign of Timur Shah was the “Prince of Kandahar”.
ZT, 1965: 59: “I have no trust in your speeches promising faithfulness”) and kept in mind the separation of the province under his rule.³ But Zaman Shah felt himself very determined. He considered himself the Shahinshah, i.e., the emperor and the heir of his glorious grandfather Ahmad Shah and refused to admit the possibility of the Empire’s separation or falling apart. That’s why Humayun’s letter enraged him, and he immediately marched towards Kandahar with a large force which had been recently assembled mainly by the efforts of Sardar Payinda Khan. The latter headed the advance guard of the Shah’s army together with young Shuja ul-Mulk. Near Qalat-i Ghilzai Payinda Khan met the enemy’s advance guard commanded by Mirakhir Mihr Ali Khan and managed to “set him on the right way of submission to His Majesty Shah Zaman” [ST, 1331: 46]. That meant that Humayun was right when he did not trust the Durrani chieftains.²

Mihr Ali Khan was a nephew (a brother’s son) of Madad Khan Ishaqzai, the commander-in-chief of Timur Shah’s army during this Emperor’s reign. Having gained glory in battles, he was given a high title of the Master of the Horse (mirakhur).³ After the desertion of Mihr Ali Khan Humayun had to escape from Kandahar to take refuge in Baluchistan at the court of Nasir Khan Baluch, so that Zaman Shah took possession of Kandahar “without a single drop of blood shed” [ST, 1331: 46]. In sign of gratitude for the throne and Kandahar Payinda Khan was granted the title of a sardar (here: chief) of all the Afghan tribes except for the Durrani and the Ghilzai and received a prodigious salary of 80 thousand rupees per year [Rishtiya, 1958: 34].

The Baluchi chieftain Nasir Khan had considered himself a retainer of the Durrani king on the condition of sending about 5-6 thousand of horsemen to the Afghan army. The intercession of Nasir Khan for Shahzada Humayun⁴ diverted Zaman Shah from the idea of following Humayun to Baluchistan, and Zaman marched towards Herat to gain loyalty of another elder brother, Shahzada Mahmud. On his way there he received a letter from him with the words of obedience and loyalty and therefore returned to Kabul, retaining Herat for Shahzada Mahmud [TS, 1298: 162]. ST gives the following explanation of the sudden loyalty of Mahmud. At first, this prince “had definitely decided to defend” [Ibid.] that means to fight Zaman Shah and moved his troops against his brother’s army. On the way he was informed that Qalij Khan Taimuri who had been appointed by him a commander of the fortress of Herat, betrayed him and began to negotiate with the Shah. Because Mahmud returned to Herat and Qalij Khan was compelled to retire, the chance was missed, and now Mahmud didn’t feel himself powerful enough to fight his brother. So, Mahmud did not only send a servile and self-humiliating message to the Shah but joined him at Kusk-i Nakhud. On this private meeting Zaman, “from the brotherly compassion and according to the custom, usual

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1 An example of centrifugal tendency soon to become dominating.
2 [ZT, 1965: 71-72]: “In the night treacherous Mihr Ali mirakhur // let futile ideas and vice intentions enter his heart, and the damned devil became his helper. He remembered that in the lifetime of Timur Shah, may he rest in peace, he had made an agreement with Zaman... He thought that if Humayun Shah arrives here, there would be no way for escape and now there is a good chance to leave together with his tribe. In the morning that unfaithful, impolite, and treacherous person took away his tribe... He became disobedient out of his ingratitude and dishonored his name forever. Devil made him to go astray! He began to shout that he had come from Shahabaddin with a large army and is going to fight. Due to this trick and ruse, he escaped from the army of the Shahzada and started to run. He was running all the way to the Shah-Zaman’s camp... Shah-Zaman considered the mirakhur’s coming good omen and rejoiced.” It is noteworthy that in this source Prince Humayun is called Humayun Shah (but also a Shahzada), and Zaman Shah is called by his original name Shah-Zaman.
3 He was a murid of shaikh Shah Izatullah Mujaddadi Faruqi Naqshbandi [Fufalzai, 1968, v. 2: 382]
4 About the intercession of Nasir-Khan see in [ST, 1331: 46]: “The King’s throne was reached by a servile entreaty of Nasir Khan containing the words of intercession for Shahzada Humayun. He wrote: Though the Shahzada hadn’t preserved his dignity and had disgraced himself due to instigation of his retainers, he has entered Your Majesty’s most obedient servant’s home in the search of protection. Not refusing to bring him out to the Highest Threshold /Your Majesty’s humble servant preserves that/ taking into consideration his most humble entreaty for excuse, that action would spoil the fame of Your Majesty’s benevolence”. In [ZT, 1965: 87-89] the circumstances of Humayun’s stay in Baluchistan at the court of Nasir Khan are described in more details. Nasir Khan kept an ambivalent position; he couldn’t fight Shah Zaman whom he considered his overlord, and he couldn’t hand Humayun over to Zaman because it would be, by his own opinion, dishonestly [Ibid.: 90]. I consider this case to be a striking example of the intercession custom as an inseparable part of Afghan and Baluchi common law.
among the close relatives”, received Mahmud’s submissions and agreed to protect Herat for him [ST, 1331: 46-47].

Meanwhile Timur Shah’s death and the disputed succession had caused “great confusion” (Elphinstone) in the remote provinces and encouraged foreign enemies to intrusion. Shah Murad, the ruler of Bukhara, probably incited by Shahzada Mahmud invaded Balkh immediately. The Afghan governor of the province was drawn into an ambush with the greater part of his 4 thousand men and was taken prisoner in the subsequent fight. Shah Murad advanced to the capital of the province, but the Durrani chiefs prepared for a defense. The ruined city of Balkh was abandoned but the fort held out for three or four months. To force the defenders of the fort to surrender, Shah Murad threatened to put their governor to death under the fort’s walls. The garrison refused to abandon the fort and the governor was executed before their eyes [Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 309]. But afterwards, upon hearing of Zaman Shah’s victory over his brother, Shah Murad left Balkh and renewed the treaty which had been made with Timur Shah.

In December 1793 Zaman moved from Kabul to Peshawar, which was his winter residence. It was his first march to the East of the Empire. As soon as he had secured himself from his rivals for the throne, he determined to invade India (meaning Lahore and as far as possible eastwards) immediately. According to Elphinstone, he “was stimulated by Meerza Ahsun Bukht (Mirza Ahsanbakht), a Shahzada of the royal family of Delhi”, who lived in Kabul since Timur Shah’s reign, and “by ambassadors who arrived about this time from Tippoo Sooltaun (Tipu Sultan of Mysore), and who made great pecuniary offers to the King, on condition that he should attack the British” [Elphinstone, 1815, v. 2: 308]. From Peshawar Zaman Shah sent the army to Kashmir, the richest province of the Durrani Empire, which had rebelled on Timur’s death. The mission was successful; the Afghan governor of Kashmir submitted to Zaman and promised to deliver taxes in time. The Shah himself marched to Sindh and laid the mirs under contribution of two million four hundred thousand rupees [Ibid.: 310]. In the spring of 1794, having received the news of Shahzada Humayun’s new rebellion, Zaman Shah was compelled to return to Kabul.

By that time Nasir Khan Baluch had died and his throne in Kalat became the matter for dispute, and it was claimed both by Mahmud Khan bin Nasir Khan and a nephew of the late Khan. Finally, the nephew won and ascended the Baluchi throne. As the spies reported to Zaman Shah, the new Baluchi Khan began to stimulate Shahzada Humayun by the following words: “The throne of sultanat belongs to you! Unite the Durrani tribes and take the possession of Kandahar!” [ST, 1331: 46] Having received this news, Zaman Shah immediately sent Hafiz Sher Muhammad Khan Ashraf ul-Wuzara off to Baluchistan with a selected force. He was ordered to bring Humayun to Peshawar by persuasion. Ashraf ul-Wuzara managed to induce the Shahzada and they left for Peshawar (supposedly via Kabul) together. Presumably Zaman Shah didn’t have any treacherous plans concerning his elder brother who would be probably excused like Mahmud had been; if not granted the post of a governor of a province (possibly, even Kandahar), he would certainly enjoy life as a honorable person at the Shah’s Court. But thereafter Humayun demonstrated his ambitions and began to act against Zaman. That inevitably led to a fratricidal war.

On their way to Zaman Shah’s Court Ashraf ul-Wuzara and Shahzada Humayun were accompanied by a sayyid whose name was Khudadad Alavi Fushanji. Secretly from Sher Muhammad Khan, the sayyid suggested to Shahzada Humayun to overthrow Zaman Shah and asked for a post of wazir for himself. Shahzada Humayun agreed. Ashraf ul-Wuzara got aware of

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1 Mir (from amir) was the title of the Muslim rulers of Talpur dynasty (1783-1843) of Sindh. The Talpur dynasty was established in 1783 by Mir Fath Ali Khan Talpur who defeated the previous Kalhora dynasty of Sindh (supported by the Durrani dynasty) at the Battle of Halani and ruled from Hyderabad with the help of his three brothers. The Talpurs were Sindhi-speaking Baluchis.

2 He was a son of Shah Wali Khan, wazir (first minister) of Ahmad Shah, who had been executed by Timur Shah for the support of another Shahzada – Sulayman – in his claims for the Durrani throne. Shah Zaman returned Sher Muhammad Khan from exile and cancelled his disgrace [ST, 1331: 46]. Sher Muhammad Khan became one of the most faithful associates of Zaman. He left for Baluchistan being totally devoted to the Shah [TS, 1298: 163].

3 Sayyid – an honorific surname of Muslims recognized as descendants of Prophet Muhammad.
this and under a favorable pretext fled from conspirators and hastened to Peshawar. The two conspirators, “earlier having dreamt on a bowl of wine of their desire, now felt its taste in their mouths”, called for their adherents and gathered some irregular forces. Thereafter they “turned the face of hostility towards Kandahar” [ST, 1331: 47]. Payinda Khan had to defend the city. He stayed in Kandahar with such Durrani sardars as Abdullah Khan Nurzai, Kadu Khan Barakzai and Yar Muhammad Sadozai while the nominal governor was the seven-years old Shahzada Qaiser, the eldest son of the Shah. Payinda Khan fought Shahzada Humayun and at first defeated him. Little Qaiser was present at this battle. Following the retreating enemy in the heat of victory they forgot about Qaiser. Having seen that his nephew had been left alone, Humayun rode to him and with his own hand made him a heavy wound. This had brought the fighting to a sudden end. Warriors of Payinda Khan retreated, he himself together with a group of sardars moved to Peshawar, while Humayun, with Qaiser, took the possession of Kandahar [TS, 1298: 164].

ST ends this account with important psychological details. First, the defenders of Shahzada Qaiser didn’t dare not only to fight against the eldest grandson of Ahmad Shah Durrani, but to prevent him from any possible actions. Therefore, they just scattered widely. Second, “cruel and pitiless Humayun” was put to shame by his own son Ahmad, who “with tearful eyes” exclaimed: “It is so inhuman and shameful to make a wound to a child, to your own nephew! Nearly your own son!”. Shahzada Humayun made accuses saying that he was enraged, then dismounted, took the kid in his hands, cuddled, and kissed him, and afterwards ordered the surgeon “to smear his wound with a curative ointment” [ST, 1331: 48].

Shahzada Humayun’s stay in Kandahar was a short-termed. He believed that he had gained the support of the strong Nurzai chieftain Ahmad Khan, well-known as an excellent warrior. Therefore, when Zaman Shah marched from Kabul with a large army, Humayun appointed Ahmad Khan the head of his advance guard. It was almost predictable that Ahmad Khan immediately went over to the army headed by sardar Payinda Khan. Shahzada Humayun and a small number of his adherents fled to Herat, to Shahzada Mahmud. Zaman Shah demanded to deliver Humayun to him, but Mahmud hesitated not wishing to betray a person whom he had praised by his protection. Shahzada Humayun preferred not to wait for the threatening appearance of Zaman Shah and run away back to Baluchistan, and therefrom to Multan. “After a long flight” he was seized by an Afghan ruler of the district of Leah, was blinded under the order of the Shah, and imprisoned in the Bala Hisar [ST, 1331: 49]. The rest of his life he passed in confinement [Elphinstone, 1815: 310]. Zaman Shah left Shahzada Qaiser in Kandahar and returned to Kabul. Thus far, writes Elphinstone, Zaman’s “government had proceeded with reasonable conduct and with great success” [Ibid.]. Now his claim for the throne was indisputable and all the country left by Timur Shah had submitted to his authority. “The King himself was active and enterprising, and his capacity seemed sufficient... to have remedied the mistakes of his father’s administration and restored the Durrani affairs...” [Ibid.]. Zaman was easy-going, energetic, warlike, strenuous, and full of strength. He seemed to be an opposite of his father who was licentious and glutonous person. Both within the country and beyond its boundaries the name of Zaman Shah remained a good fame. He bore such titles as “The Emperor of the Age”, “The Banner-bearer of Islam”, “Ahmad-shah the Second”, “The Greatest among the most Righteous” and even “Napoleon of the Orient” [Fufalzai, 1968, v.1: 293]. By his active and strenuous life Zaman Shah “had confirmed that the election of him as a successor...”.

1 However, in fact Ahmad Khan with his Nurzais and some other Durranis at first fought against the army of Shahzada Humayun but suffered a defeat. “He received two wounds... and retreated from the battlefield. He was compelled to retreat because the most of his companions were the chieftains of those Durance tribes who were the adherents of the Shahzada ... He rode 6 kuruhs [about 18 km] but because of great loss of blood he fainted and fell from his horse. He was found and moved to a hermit by a dervish Mullah Hasan... The next day /Shahzada Humayun/ was informed that sardar Ahmad Khan resides in the Mullah’s lodging and demanded to bring him He was going to put him to death but because of the intercession of Kandahari sayyids, ulama and faqirs he showed mercy to him. /Ahmad Khan/ expressed his obedience to the Shahzada, as if in sign of gratitude but truly because he was afraid to be killed” [ST, 1331: 48]. Among other things, we see here an example of mediation in reconciliation, where, according to Pashtun customary law, the mediators are clergy: sayyids (the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), ulama (the guardians and transmitters of Muslim knowledge) and faqirs (Sufis). See: [Dzhandsova, 2006].
to the throne had really brought profit to the country and supported its prestige... Zaman Shah was the only son of Timur-shah who had manifested himself as a patriot, a defender of Islam and a fighter for freedom” [Ibid.]. The last phrase means that the Muslim rulers of Northern India looked at him as the only protector against the British. They used to send him messages asking for help, stimulating him to invade India [ST, 1331: 50]. The rumors of the projected Afghan invasion into India alarmed the Court of Directors of the East India Company, whose possessions and rule were at this time advanced up to Delhi, and “they forthwith dispatched a mission to the court of the Kajar... for the purpose of utilizing the Persian monarch as a counterpoise to the dreaded designs of the Afghan” [Bellew, 1879: 31]. In the nearest future that strategy brought its fruits.

In their discussions on Zaman Shah’s policy, on his achievements and mistakes, the historians never refuse to mention his persistent wish to repeat his grandfather’s route and to restore the Afghan domination in India:

He contemplated the resuscitation of the fast-fading away glory of the Durrani by a resort to the rich treasure-stores of India... [Bellew, 1879: 30].

Zaman Shah could not refrain from wasting his strength in his attempts to rival his grandfather’s conquests in India [Sykes, 1940: 373].

Zaman Shah had huge plans: he wished to restore the empire of Ahmad-shah Durrani... [Rishtiya, 1958: 35].

He was so intensely devoted to the project that he would not concern himself with anything besides this idea. Even if he saw anything apart from this project, he would always sacrifice it to the main issue, which consumed his being. No year would he sit idle without thinking and planning as to how he could to the easternmost of his onetime province, that is Lahore [Kohzad, 1967: 4].

Elphinstone also stresses that India (and first Punjab) was the favorite object of Zaman’s ambitions, but all his attempts at Indian conquest were ill-directed and ill-timed [Elphinstone, 1815, v. 2: 312]. Dreaming only about India, Zaman didn’t pay much attention to the securing of the support of his own tribe and didn’t bother much to defend Khorasan which had become the object of desire of the new Persian ruler – Agha Mohammad-shah Qajar.

At the end of 1795 Zaman Shah commenced his first invasion of the Punjab which in former times had been an inseparable part of the Durrani Empire, but at the time of Timur-shah began to go out of the Afghan control. The rebellion of the Sikhs seemed to become a very serious problem for the Durrani shah [ST, 1331: 49]. Wishing to reduce the Sikhs, Zaman crossed the Indus by a bridge of boats at Attock and advanced three marches to Hasanabdal. Therefrom he detached a large force to take possession of Rutas. After the success in this object the Afghan force was joined by many Muslims of the Punjab and reached the number of 7 thousand warriors. The Sikhs fled in dismay to the mountains. Zaman went on hunting in Rutas while his force was sent to Duaba to fight the Sikhs. After each defeat the Sikhs used to gather their force and continued to oppose the Afghans. In the decisive battle near Gujrat “because of the weakness of the Durrani force” and not coordinated actions of their commanders the Afghans retreated, though “without throwing away their weapons and without leaving any booty for the enemies” [ST, 1331: 49].

The Shah had only been a week in Hasanabdal when he was informed on the invasion of the west of Khorasan by Agha Mohammad-Khan Qajar and was forced to return immediately to defend his territory. He made such a hasty departure that by the 3rd of January of 1796 he had already arrived at Peshawar. By his invasion Shah Qajar put the end to the rule of the last Afshars in Meshed, which had been formally dependent on Kabul. Shahrul Afshar, the old and blind grandson of Nadir-shah, gave himself on the mercy of the conqueror and was seized on entering the Persian camp. After the barbarous tortures and torments (to make him give up Nadir’s treasures) he was murdered. His son Nadir-mirza fled to Kabul as the Persians approached. “This attack gave great cause both of indignation and alarm” to Shah-Zaman [Elphinstone, 1815, v. 2: 315] and he returned to Kabul, preparing for war.

But he had to fight not the Persians but his own brother. Shahzada Mahmud marched from Herat towards Kandahar with a large force. Zaman Shah hurried to Kandahar from Kabul. A battle of two advance guards (headed by Muhammad Azim-Khan Alkozai on behalf of Mahmud and
sardar Mihr Ali-Khan on behalf of the Shah) took place in Khakrez. The Mahmudians compelled
the Shah’s advance guard to retreat and took possession of its artillery, which had been left on the
battlefield. When the Shah himself advanced from the rear with the main force and got aware of the
situation, he took off his rich turban, decorated with diamonds, and put on a modest headgear. His
adherents asked him about the reason of the change of clothes. The Shah answered that it was
necessary for the enemy not to recognize him and encouraged his commanders to make an attack
[ST, 1331: 51]. The detachments of Nawab-Khan Alkozai¹ and the Qalmaq ghulams² defeated the
army headed by Muhammad Azim-Khan, Alkozai and himself fled away. Mahmud returned to
Herat with his main force. The local Khans and sardars took the ambiguous position, having
expressed their obedience first to Zaman Shah and then, after his departure, to Shahzada Mahmud.
Despite this Mahmud was afraid to play with fire and “he asked his respectable mother to go the
court of the powerful Shah and bring his submissive entreaty of mercy” [Ibid.].³ Having returned to
Mahmud with the Shah’s merciful letter the mother said to her son: “Be happy with the mercy given
to you by the Shah and be fully satisfied with it. Don’t oppose the God and be obedient to the
Shah!” [Ibid.] For a certain time Shahzada Mahmud was quiet.

But Zaman Shah still was perturbed by the situation in Khorasan. On the one hand he would
like to see his retainers in Meshed, but on the other hand he realized that his rival Mahmud is
looking forward for the support of the Qajar. As the head of one hundred thousand-army Zaman
sent a rumor that he is going to start a war against Iran [ST, 1331: 52]. He proposed to the Uzbeks
to join the league against the Persians. These measures made Agha Mohammad-Qajar to send
an embassy to Kandahar. The Qajar’s ambassador Mohammad Hosein-Khan Qaragezlu Hamadani
arrived with gifts and a letter assuring Zaman Shah in Shah Qajar’s friendly sentiments. Zaman
Shah reviewed his troops in the presence of the Iranian ambassador, hoping that Shah Qajar would
be informed “about the power and the splendor of the Afghans” [Ibid.]. Therefore Quadu-Khan
Barakzai was sent to Teheran as an Afghan ambassador.

Believing that he had secured his control over the western dominions (because he wasn’t
really going to fight for Khorasan), Zaman Shah determined to put into being his favorite project –
the Great Indian Campaign. “His ministers didn’t approve this decision” – writes Faiz Muhammad,
probably meaning sardar Payinda-Khan. They said that at first Shahzada Mahmud should be totally
submitted. But Zaman hoped that having heard his mother’s advice, Mahmud wouldn’t dare to
oppose the Shah once again [ST, 1331: 52]. The march to the Punjab seemed to be more necessary
because the Sikh chiefs refuse to pay taxes to the Afghans and were conducting themselves as
independent rulers. The threat of the separation of the Punjab from the Durrani Empire troubled
Ahmad-shah’s grandson more than occupation of Meshed by the Qajar. In the December of 1796
the advance guard numbering twenty thousand men, under the head of the faithful Sher
Muhammad-Khan Mukhtar ud-Dawla, started from Peshawar followed by the main force (from 30
to 80 thousand men, probably including the servants⁴) headed by Zaman himself. The advance
guard marched through Attock, Hasanabdal, Ravalpindi and Rutas and crossed the rivers Jelum and
Chenab. Sher Muhammad-Qajar stopped in 3 kuruhs before Lahore, on the right bank of the Ravi.
“At the sight of the Shah’s army the Sikhs realized the threat, dispersed and looked for the shelter
in the mountains” [ST, 1331: 52]. Mukhtar ud-Dawla entered the city and ordered to adorn it to
celebrate the meeting of the Shah. On the first of Rajab of 1211 (31st of December 1797) Shah
Zaman solemnly entered the capital of the Punjab. Though the local people didn’t applaud much on
the seizure of the city by Zaman Shah, he preferred not to castigate them being sure that “such a

¹ In this battle two Alkozai chiefs fought against each other, so it is difficult to say that the Durrani tribes had divided in
their support of Shah-Zaman and Mahmud.
² Qalmaqs (jungar, oirot) were brought to Kabul and included into the Corps of GhulamKhana in the times of Timur-
shah’s reign. Ghulam = slave.
³ One should remember that Shahzada Mahmud’s mother was not only a widow of Timur-shah but also a sister of
sardar Payinda-Khan Barakzai. This episode confirms the important role of women as mediators in the Afghan custom
of reconciliation. See:
⁴ [Gankovsky, 1985: 144].
punishment doesn’t correspond with the principles of state administration” [Ibid.] but imposed on them jizya (a tax laid usually upon non-Muslims). The tax was so severe that some Hindus committed suicide being unable to pay the tax. The warriors of Sher Muhammad-Khan and the detachments of the Muslim landlords of the province were withstanding the pressure of the Sikh partisans in the city’s surroundings and used to send the chopped off heads of their enemies to the Shah, who nevertheless didn’t allow the complete looting and barbarous plunder of the Punjabi population [Ibid.].

By this time Shahzada Mahmud, with the help of Ata Muhammad-Khan Alkozai, succeeded to gather an army of thirty thousand men, mainly Khorasanis. Shah Zaman was informed about this new threat in the West of his Empire and didn’t determine to move towards Amritsar, the saint city of the Sikhs, or even towards Delhi [TS, 1298: 165]. But he remained in Lahore waiting for the new information from the West. “Meanwhile the Sikhs believed that the Shah had stopped murder and plunder because of his own weakness” and assembled a few thousand men in a fort near Lahore. Mukhtar ud-Dawla besieged the fort and the Sikhs asked for mercy. All those who had yielded for the winner’s mercy, were forgiven on the condition of the payment of “baj and kharaj” (i.e., land tax) [ST, 1331: 53]. That time the Sikhs were compelled to admit themselves the retainers of the Afghan shah (using the ST terminology, they “submitted to the firman (i.e., to the order of the Shah”)]. Thereafter Zaman Shah was going to go to Shah-Jahanabad to surrender the rebelled Juts [Ibid.], but the threat coming from Shahzada Mahmud became so evident that he was compelled to return to Afghanistan.

According to Elphinstone, the occupation of Lahore by Zaman Shah “did not fail in creating a strong sensation throughout India”. Since the whole forces of the Mahrattas had been drawn southwards, and the government of Delhi was feeble, and most Nabab Vazir’s subjects were disposed to insurrection and revolt, the North of India was “a scene of disorder andarchy which would doubtless have opened as soon as the Shauh had advanced to Delhi” [Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 315-316]. The hopes of the Muslims of India related to Zaman Shah who was considered a defender of Islam against the advancing East India Company. “Every Mussulmaun, even in the remotest regions of Deccan, waited in anxious expectation for the advance of the champion of Islaam” [Ibid: 316]. And despite the failure of Zaman’s expedition, “the impression of his advance was permanent” [Ibid.]. Years passed before the Mahrattas were relieved from their fear of the appearance of the “second Ahmad-shah”. The British government adopted some measures: first, sent a large force to strengthen the frontier of its ally the ruler of Delhi; and second, directed a mission to Fath Ali-shah Qajar in 1799, to secure India from new attacks by Zaman.

On 16th of March of 1797 Zaman Shah reached Kabul. His hasty return prevented Mahmud from the occupation of Kandahar. His commander-in-chief, Ata Muhammad-Khan Alkozai was secretly put to death by a killer sent by the order of the Shah [ST, 1331: 54]. Shahzada Mahmud started to negotiate with his brother and asked for the renewal of the payment of an annual subsidy of two hundred thousand rupees fixed for him by Timur-shah, and for the payment of all the debts on this subsidy. Zaman promised to renew the payment of the subsidy, but categorically refused to play the debts. After this bargain, having not agreed on the price of Mahmud’s submission, the two brothers again started the war [Ibid.]. Mahmud believed that most of the Durrani was would be his supporters and remembered that their chieftains themselves had pushed him for the revolt. The two advance guards commenced a fighting near Farah. The battle lasted for a few days and its result was not clear when the Shah arrived with the main force. It was in September of 1797.1 Both Afghan and British sources stress that the Shah’s force was at that moment in a very bad condition and wasn’t prepared for a prolonged campaign:

Because of the lack both of forage fodder and of money needed for the provision of the men, the Shah’s army fell in an extraordinary tight condition. [ST, 1331: 54].

His own injudicious arrangements had nearly exposed him to defeat... [Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 316].

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1 According to Elphinstone, Zaman marched from Kandahar on the 8th of September [Account, v.2: 316].
But soon the betrayal of Qalij-Khan, the commandant of Herat, and of some chiefs of the Shahzada Mahmud’s army allowed to name the winner. By chance, Mahmud escaped from the prison where he had been drawn on by the traitors, and fled with all his family, including his uterine brother Firuz ud-Din, and his son Kamran, at first to mountains and afterwards to Teheran via Meshed, and was there kindly received. Zaman immediately entered Herat, appointed young Qaisar the governor of the city, and returned to Kabul. Therefrom he again turned his attention to the East and first moved to Peshawar. He was informed that the Sikhs had returned from their hiding-places and began to oppress the Muslim administration of the province [ST, 1331: 55; Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 317]. To put the situation under his control, the Shah started with his third expedition to India. He set off from Peshawar on the 25th of October of 1798. After the first news of the Zaman’s arrival reached raja Mahabat Singh, he immediately fled to mountains [TS, 1298: 167]. The Zaman’s politics towards the Sikhs went a radical change:

*He persevered in his plan for conciliating the Sikhs, and by all accounts no outrage of any sort was offered to the inhabitants of the Punjaub during this campaign. Many Sik chiefs and Mussulmaun Zemeendarz attended the court, and before the King withdrew the chiefs had done homage in person, or through their agents; and among the former was Runjeet Sing...* [Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 317].

Having arranged the administration in Kashmir and the Punjaub, Zaman refused to move towards Delhi because he disliked possible encounter with the British, and returned to Peshawar, which he reached on the 30th of January 1799. After a short stay in Peshawar Zaman Shah marched to Herat where he decided to spend the rest of the year. That was another important change in his politics: he appeared to have turned his attention to secure his western provinces. When Fath Ali-shah Qajar failed in all his attempts in Khorasan, Zaman moved from Herat to Kandahar.

Soon after his withdrawal, Shahzada Mahmud besieged Herat with an army of ten thousand men consisting mainly of Iranians; his Iranian supporter Mihr Ali-Khan, the ruler of Kain and Berjend provided them to him. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Shiah population of Herat was supporting the besiegers. But due to a trick made by Muhammad Zaman-Khan, the regent of young Shahzada Qaisar, the Iranian commanders of the Mahmud’s army were slandered in his eyes and were obliged to retreat. He himself fled to Bukhara [ST, 1331: 58]. Zaman Shah sent a message to Shah Murad-bey, the ruler of Bukhara, asking to deliver Shahzada Mahmud to his court. Mahmud pleaded for mercy. Thanks to the intercession of some Muslim authorities, Mahmud was allowed to leave for Mecca. He moved to Khiva and therefrom to Teheran [ST, 1331: 59].

Having no time for leisure, Zaman Shah received bad news from the Punjaub: that the Sikhs headed by Raja Mahabat Singh had killed the governor of the province, Ahmad-Khan Barakzai, and took possession of Lahore. Having left Shahzada Qaisar in Herat with Mir Afzal-Khan Ishaqzai as a regent, Zaman Shah immediately moved to Kabul via the mountains of Hazarajat and Bamian. In Kabul Zaman Shah had arranged all the necessary preparations and marched towards Lahore. At the news of the Shah’s arrival the Sikhs dispersed. Thereafter the Zaman’s policy concerning the Punjab undertook a change. As the source informs, Zaman Shah realized that he lacks power to maintain the Afghan administration in the province and must give power to the Sikhs as his retainers.

*Taking into consideration that the tribe of the Sikhs is always ready to revolt and to rebel and thereby leads into disorder the whole province of the Punjaub, /the Shah/ decided to give the post of the governor of Lahore to anyone of this very tribe, for only in this case the tender face of a bride, which is the state, wouldn’t be scratched by the nails of insurrection [ST, 1331: 59].

The first governor of Lahore ruling on behalf of Zaman Shah Durrani was young Ranjit Singh, whom the Shah had personally appointed.

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1 Muslim landlords.
2 Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the future founder of the Sikh state.
3 So, in [ST, 1331: 58]. But Elphinstone writes, that “an artful expedient to render Mahmood suspicious of a design on the part of Mehr Ali to betray him” was managed by “Wuffadar” (Wafadar-Khan) [Account, v.2: 318].
4 Son of Madad-Khan Ishaqzai.
Thus, the whole life of Zaman Shah consisted of endless campaigns from the East to the West and from the West to the East of the weakening Empire. He didn’t lose the hope to preserve the state within its former boundaries. He would send officials to collect taxes even from the remote provinces of Kashmir, Sind, and Multan [ST, 1331: 55]. He would appoint Afghan hakims (governors) to the faraway areas of his Empire, providing for them war-like troops of the Durrans, the Khuttaks, the Bungushes and the Yusufzais [ST, 1331: 53: 56] With the assistance of Sher Muhammad-Khan, Zaman secured the obedience of Mahmud-Khan Baluch [ST, 1331: 49]. Having got notice about the death of Agha Mohammad-Khan Qajar, Zaman immediately ordered the same Sher Muhammad-Khan to bring to Meshed the Afshar Shahzadas (Abbas Mirza and Nadir Mirza) and to enthrone them as the Durrani shah’s retainers [ST, 1331: 55]. Zaman believed that he had also secured the loyalty of the Charaimaq, the Hazaras, and the Taimanis [Ibid.].

In 1212 A.H. (1797/98) Shah Zaman reached the age of thirty years. Even if the above-mentioned titles of Zaman Shah are marked by the usual Oriental servility and fawning, nevertheless they reflect the Zaman’s notion of an ideal monarch. He was eager to rule honestly, according to the Pushhtun Honour Code: “Every inflicted was rewarded by him in a proper way; he would punish and rule by justice; he would split bellies1 and pull-out nostrils of the tyrants. We can say that he followed the habits of his folks” [ST, 1331: 57]. Maybe from the European point of view he looked as a rather “extravagant, cruel and oppressive” [Bellew, 1879: 30] person. But we can attribute to the reign of Zaman Shah the following testimony of Elphinstone concerning the considerable tolerance of the Afghan rulers:

The Afghan government has always shown a good deal of moderation towards its own subjects, its dependent states, and even its enemies. It is mild in punishment, and its lenity is more conspicuous, from a comparison with the severity of the Persians. It is not uncommon for a great rebellion to terminate without a single execution; and when there are punishments for rebellions, they always fall on the chiefs alone. The Persian practice of blinding or maiming the common people is unknown…The use of torture was learned from the Persians… but only under Mahmood that it is commonly practiced... [Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 248].

Zaman Shah was the last great Sadozai, the last Emperor, and he could be remembered by his people as a good King, if not “a fatal mistake” which he had made in the beginning of his reign, and which had led to a tragedy at the end of it. That mistake was the ascension of Rahmatullah-Khan Kamrankhel Sadozai who soon became a wazir, i.e., a first minister of the state. When Rahmatullah-Khan had begun his career at the court, he was only “a handsome youth with a good handwriting” and nothing more [TS, 1298: 168]. Not being a too diligent statesman, he had gained the Shah’s confidence “by supple and insinuating manners” [Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 312] and soon became his adviser in all the matters of administration. When he was appointed a wazir with the title of Wafadar-Khan (The Devoted), he deprived Sardar Payinda-Khan Barakzai, who had been previously considered “the Sardar of the sardars”, of his power. When Rahmatullah-Khan began his elevation at the court, Sardar Payinda-Khan didn’t pay much attention to him, and when other noblemen used to tell him: “Don’t let Rahmatullah be so close to the Shah! He will put you in trouble! sardar only laughed: ‘How can he hurt me?’” [TS, 1298: 168]. According to Elphinstone, Wafadar-Khan “had used his ascendancy to overturn the power of Sirafrauz Khan, and all the great officers of the army and state: he seems to have perfectly understood the disposition of his master, who though proud and imperious, was easily led by flatterers... and, with all his fondness for activity and enterprize, had no patience or application sufficient for managing the details of business [Elphinstone, 1815, v.2: 312-313].

The elevation of Wafadar-Khan and especially his consequent conduct (“He looked at all amirs, including Sardar Payinda-Khan, with despise, didn’t recognize anyone and didn’t listen to anyone’s words” [ST, 1331: 59]) enraged and disgusted not only the Durrans, but also the Qizilbashs whose position in the beginning of Zaman’s reign was very strong. This disgust was increased by some personal qualities of Wafadar-Khan that contradicted to Pushhtun Honor Code:

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1 For example, “he split the bellies of four Durrans to punish them for looting in a Sayyid village” [ST, 1331: 57].
“He was ambitious and haughty to those who might claim equality with him, and jealous of any who could attempt to rival or favour; but his arrogance and confidence in council were equalled by his timidity when exposed to personal danger, a circumstance which added contempt to the dislike with which he was otherwise regarded” [Elphinstone, Account, v. 2: 313].

The disgust towards Wafadar-Khan resulted in a complot¹ aiming to assassinate him, to overthrow Zaman Shah and to enthrone the brother Shuja ul-Mulk. After the conspiracy had been disclosed² six conspirators (all of them Durrani and Qizilbash chiefs) and among them Sardar Payinda Khan Barakzai, Sardar Muhammad Azim Khan Alkozai and Amir Khan Arslan Jawanshir were beheaded. This event took place in 1799. By the execution of Payinda Khan, Zaman Shah not only deprived himself of a wise adviser and a brave warrior. He also lost a support of his people. The sanguinary measures excited the indignation all over Afghanistan. From this time the clan of Barakzaiz, and at first hand the sons of Payinda Khan, became the worst enemies of Zaman Shah. The Persian-speaking population of Kabul didn’t forgive him the execution of their leader Amir Arslan Khan Jawanshir.

The strange “blindness” of Zaman Shah who trusted the state matters to such an unrespectable person as Rahmatullah Khan, can be explained by the fact that Zaman Shah wanted to weaken the influence of the tribal authorities and to modernize the state system. Moving from one flank of his Empire to another one, he needed to keep a stronghold in the center to have a more secured inner situation, but at the same time he didn’t like to look for support among tribal chieftains, fearing that at any moment they could betray him. Eventually, Payinda-Khan considered himself the head of his own clan of Barakzaiz and not a kind of a “Afghan statesman”. The prejudice of Zaman Shah against the tribal leaders turned to be fatal for him.

The last days of Zaman Shah’s rule are described in Shah Shuja’s Memoirs. Persuaded by the army of Shahzada Mahmud and Fath Khan, the eldest son of the deceased Payinda Khan, betrayed by Ahmad Khan Nurzai, Zaman moved from Muqur to Peshawar to find support from his brother Shuja ul-Mulk and to gather a new army to fight against Shahzada Mahmud. On his way there, feeling seek and tired, he stayed at a small fortress (qala) belonging to a person named Ashiq from the tribe of the Shinwaris. Ashiq Shinwari received him as a padishah, i.e. a king, but when the Padishah went to sleep, the owner of the qala locked the gates and surrounded the fortress by two hundred of his tribesmen. The Shah’s guard was murdered. Not waiting for the dawn, Ashiq sent a messenger to inform Shahzada Mahmud about the confining of the Shah. Mahmud directed a detachment headed by the son of Payinda Khan, Nawab Asad Khan Barakzai. Though another messenger took the news to Shuja ul-Mulk, and he immediately sent one hundred horsemen at the head of Sardar Abd ul-Karim Khan Ishaqzai, but they were too late. Zaman Shah was captured, delivered to Mahmud, and blinded. Mahmud became the new Shah. [VSS: 3].

During the first reign of Mahmud Shah (1801-1803) the blinded Zaman was imprisoned in the Bala Hisar. When the power went to Shah Shuja, Zaman was released and became a highly respectable person at the court of his younger brother. When in 1809 Shah Shuja was dismissed, Zaman left together with him for India. Afterwards he returned to Kabul where was allowed to live as an honorable person (because previously he had persuaded Shuja not to make Mahmud blind) and later make pilgrimage to sacred sites like Balkh, Bukhara, Mashhad. From Mashhad Zaman left for Teheran where he was kindly received by Fath Ali Shah Qajar. Then he made a hajj to Mecca. After the hajj was completed, he settled in India secured by the British pension. He passed away in 1260 year of Hegira (1844). As Zaman said himself, “such reverses were the common portion of kings” [Elphinstone, 1815, v.1: 104].

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¹ Presumably the conspiracy was designed by Wafadar himself or by somebody else to throw a shadow on Payinda Khan [Rishitiya, 1958: 37; Romodin, 1965: 145].

² “…the conspirators met often, and notwithstanding the precautions they observed, had at last excited Waffadar’s suspicions, who had surrounded them with spies… the whole plot was unexpectedly revealed by Meerza Shereef Khaun, the deputy of the Moonshee Baushee, to whom the secret had been disclosed by one of the conspirators” [Elphinstone, 1815, v. 2: 319-320]
Conclusion. Thus, largely thanks to the efforts of Zaman Shah Durrani, at the end of the 18th century, the Durrani Empire continued to act as a regional power capable of dictating its will to many neighboring states. These efforts were largely in vain, not because Zaman was inferior in talent and determination to his great grandfather Ahmad Shah Durrani (on the contrary, historians unanimously recognize his courage and abilities), but because the situation in the region the as well as the entire geopolitical situation in world by the beginning of the 19th century changed dramatically. The crisis of Afghan statehood, which erupted after Zaman Shah’s reign, led to the collapse of the Durrani Empire and to the fragmentation of Afghanistan. So, the Durrani Empire could not survive. The weak individuals who turned out to be Shah Zaman's successors did not have the political will and strength that could unite not the whole Empire but even the Afghans in the face of the looming external threat. Mired in the squabbles of a fratricidal struggle for power, the heirs of the Durrani crown questioned the very existence of their country as Afghanistan. The Durrani’s Indian possessions first became the prey of Ranjit Singh's Sikh state and then became part of the British Empire. The western regions of the empire returned to Iran, and Herat became a bone of contention between Afghanistan and Iran for many decades. The lands between the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya, which a century earlier belonged to Bukhara, ended up in the possession of completely independent Uzbek rulers. In Kandahar, Kabul and other Afghan cities, representatives of the Barakzai clan ruled independently until the Kabul ruler Dost Muhammad Khan Barakzai began a new process of “gathering lands”. However, this happened on the eve of the First Anglo-Afghan War, and already in the era of the so-called “Great Game” between the Russian and British empires, in which Afghanistan was destined to play a very important role.

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